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I.

INTRODUCTION: A NEW ERA IN AMERICAN CIVIL PROCEDURE

About twenty years ago, on the occasion of the circulation of the draft
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that became law in 1983, I
wrote that we were entering a new era of civil procedure.' I was unsure exactly
where we were heading; it was clear, though, that the wide-open nature of the
1938 Rules, with their ease of pleading and amendment, broad joinder and
expansive discovery, and implicit encouragement of creative lawyering, was
resulting in a backlash. The 1983 amendments attempted to curtail some of the
permissiveness of the Federal Rules, acknowledging 2 an expanded scope for
pretrial conferences, including "establishing early and continuing control so
that the case will not be protracted because of lack of management" and "facilitating the settlement of the case." 3 The amended Rule 16 required scheduling
and planning conferences, and added the need to consider "the possibility of
settlement or the use of' (it now sounds so quaint) "extrajudicial procedures to
* Professor, Northeastern Univeristy School of Law. My thanks to the participants at the
William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, and the Nevada Law
Journal conference on "Perspectives on Dispute Resolution in the 21st Century" for their
comments on this paper, as well as to Matt Belanger, Steve Burbank, Brad Honoroff, and
David Matz, for their helpful suggestions. I am grateful to the lawyers at Sullivan Weinstein
& McQuay, Boston, who invited me to speak to them about this paper and provided
comments, and to Brad Honoroff, a friend and skilled mediator, who agreed to teach an ADR
course with me, and permitted me (with the consent of the participants) to witness some of
his mediations. Special thanks to Michele Pearce, research librarian at the Northeastern
University School of Law Library, who spent countless hours on the computer trying to
discover the extent that mediation is used in our country, and to my friend, Judy Brown, who
even in retirement has once again fought valiantly (often failing) to save me from myself.
The mistakes are, of course, my own.
I Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure,67 A.B.A. J. 1648, 1651
(1981).
2 I write "acknowledged" because I think David Shapiro was convincing when he pointed
out that many federal judges were already engaged in the case management and settlement
activity that the new rule now explicitly allows. Shapiro's quote (which he evidently got
from Lon Fuller) has stuck in my mind: "At best, the argument might run, the task of
rulemakers is like the task of those who lay out the walks in the Cambridge Common: Figure
out where people go and cover up the grass with cement on those routes." (footnotes omitted). David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practiceof Rulemaking,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1992 (1989).
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(2); 16(a)(5).

Winter 2002/2003]

A TRADITIONALIST LOOKS AT MEDIATION

197

resolve the dispute."4 At the same time, we were given the new, teeth-sharp-

ened (and later maligned) Rule 11, with its objective standard and mandatory
sanctions. Additionally, the amended Rule 26 encouraged judicial curtailment
of discovery and the application of new Rule l1 -like provisions to discovery

requests, responses, and objections.5
The unraveling of the Federal Rules regime did not surprise me. My
favorite procedural quote then, as now, was Maitland's observation that equity,
without common law, was a "castle in the air," an unsupported and insupporta-

ble structure. 6 It has seemed to me for at least three decades that an all-equity

procedural system, with virtually unconstrained pleading, joinder, and discovery, cries out for containment and focus. I have consistently contended that our
civil litigation system requires a balance between equity's flexibility and the
more rule-bound, circumscribed, focused common law process. I have
defended David Dudley Field's attempt to achieve predictability and to limit

arbitrary judicial behavior through defining procedural rules.7 I have urged with little success 8 - that we should experiment with some subject-specific
procedural rules in an attempt to add predictability and efficiency, 9 and have

applauded numeric and temporal limits on discovery and length of trial. I°

Lest I still have not established my formalist and pro-adjudication credentials before defecting to the other side, I want to add that much of what I have
previously written has lauded the American jury trial and exhorted American
judges to return to presiding over trials instead of expending time and energy
on ad hoc case management and luring litigants to settlement.'" In the summer
of 2000, a colleague and I spent two weeks teaching civil procedure to twenty4 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7).
5 About a decade later, I wrote about teaching civil procedure while one is watching it
disintegrate, still not knowing the contours of the new era, but quite sure that great change
was in the works. Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1155 (1993).
6

F.

MAITLAND, EQUITY ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW, Two COURSES OF

LECTURES 19 (A. H. Chaytor & W. Whittaker eds., 1920), cited in Stephen N. Subrin, How
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 983 (1987). I apologize for the self-referential nature of
these initial pages. It seems important to me to show that I do not come easily to the promediation position contained in this essay.
7 Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A HistoricalAnalysis of an
Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 311, 338-45 (1988).
8 See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An
Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 2067 (1989) and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2237 (1989). Cf Jeff Stempel's
cautious embrace some years later. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak to the
Future: Subrin's New-Old Procedureas a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss's "Tolstoy Problem," 46 FLA. L. REV. 57 (1994).
9 Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence,
and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999 (1989); Stephen N. Subrin,
Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27 (1994).
10 Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in ProceduralRules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural System: The Casefor Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79 (1997).
11 See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 10, at 99-103; Subrin, supra note 7, at 344-45; Subrin, supra
note 6, at 999.
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five Chinese civil procedure teachers in Beijing. I urged them to consider the
virtues of a brave, independent judiciary that heard and decided cases in open
court in conjunction with jurors who represented a broad spectrum of society. 12
Through these many years, I have expressed grave concerns about ADR.
In 1985, for example, I wrote Frank Sander, one of the founders of the contemporary ADR movement, that the "effort to defeat formalism so that society
could move forward on the social justice front neglected the benefits of formalism once new rights had been created .. 1..,,13
"Now perhaps," I wrote Frank,
"you see why I keep asking you what position your alternative dispute mechanisms (or your view of them) take on law application and rights vindication."
This past year marked my 65th birthday, my 40th wedding anniversary,
and my 31st year of teaching civil procedure. Although I am sensitive to the
recent convert's clichrd lack of objectivity, I think I now realize that mediation
is a major portion of the new era of civil procedure. Moreover, I have come to
believe that, despite some lingering reservations, this is a positive development
in the evolution of American civil procedure. But, mediation cannot function
effectively without a judicial recommitment to the trying of cases. It is critical
that judges do more judging and less managing.' 4 "Judge," as Judith Resnik
has recently pointed out, "is a verb as well as a noun." 15 Ironically, as mediation becomes increasingly the norm, it should become easier and more desirable for judges to judge.
By mediation, I mean "a process in which a person not involved in a dispute helps the disputing parties negotiate a settlement." 1 6 I believe that process
will continue to thrive for four reasons. First (Part II), there is much evidence
of growth. Second (Part HI), lawyers largely drive a litigation system, and
there are powerful reasons why they are drawn to settlement and, in turn, to
mediation. Third (Part IV), there are strong historical forces, including the
agendas of influential actors, pushing mediation as a major component of civil
litigation. Fourth (Part V), the increased use of mediation is salutary for many
12 STEPHEN N.

SUBRIN

&

MARGARET

Y.K. Woo,

THE NATURE OF AMERICAN CIVIL LITIGA-

(2002) (published only in
Chinese by Falu Chaba She). This was all as a means of injecting the rule of law into the
society and inculcating a respect for law in the citizenry.
13 Letter from Stephen N. Subrin to Professor Frank E.A. Sander, Harvard Law School
(Nov. 27, 1985) (on file with author).
14 This is not an argument against judges mediating cases or engaging in settlement conferences in cases that are not their own. Some judges are likely to be superb mediators, and
some litigants and their lawyers may want the advice and authority of a judge in settlement
negotiations.
"5 Judith Resnik, Trial as Error,Jurisdictionas Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article II, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 1035 (2000), quoting Hon. William R. Wilson, Jr., Where
Has All the Civility Gone?, ARK. TRIAL LAW DOCKET, Summer 1990, at 5.
16 Craig A. McEwen, Nancy H. Rogers, & Richard J. Maiman, Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairnessin Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L.
TION IN HISTORICAL, CULTURAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES

REV. 1317, 1319 n.l (1995), citing JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION 7-9 (1984)
and NANCY H. ROGERS & RICHARD A. SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE

LAW 3 (1987) [hereinafter McEwen] ("Commentators define mediation as a process in
which a person not involved in a dispute helps the disputing parties negotiate a settlement.
The mediator has no authority to issue a binding award in the event that the parties do not
reach a settlement."). Mediation can involve matters other than helping resolve a specific
dispute. See infra note 33.
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reasons and the critiques of mediation are overstated. I will end (Part VI) with
a plea for judges to spend an increased portion of their time in their more
traditional role.
I want to offer a few caveats at the beginning. ADR is not my field. I
have never mediated a case. I have not written in the field. I have taught an
ADR course only once, and that with the help of an experienced mediator.
Writing about a new field is always risky business; you may think you are
writing about a clear meadow, when in fact you have entered a dense forest.
The risks are magnified when the field is ADR, for there is a paucity of normal
trail markings as there are few statutes or rules and little case law to guide our
musings. There are no obvious original documents to draw upon. The growth
of mediation has largely been helter-skelter, without clear delineated characters
in the plot, such as Field, Pound, Shelton, Taft, Walsh, or Clark (discussed later
in the article). The politics, as I will discuss later, are hazy, with a baffling
array of proponents. As many have pointed out, we need a good deal more
convincing empirical data both of a quantitative and a qualitative nature.17
Moreover, much of the writing in the field draws on anecdotal stories and disciplines in which many of us lack expertise, such as economics, game theory,
anthropology, and psychology. 1 8 When one writes about mediation, therefore,
she lacks the normal scaffolding of more traditional legal scholarship.
II.

THE

GROWTH OF MEDIATION

Notwithstanding extensive research efforts, I have been unable to find
concrete data on the extent of mediation's use in our country. This is not sur-

prising. ADR, at least in its modem state, is relatively young. The National
Center for State Courts reports on its website that "because programs, rules,
etc. vary so much from state to state, and even within a single state, national
data [about ADR] is nearly impossible to come by and even more difficult to
analyze." 19 Settlement data is always difficult to ascertain "because settlements are often kept confidential and the settling parties must agree to disclosure." 20 Notwithstanding the dearth of hard data, I think the anecdotal
evidence is overwhelming that mediation is growing exponentially.
Here are but a few of my own anecdotes. Two of my friends started The
Mediation Group in Brookline, Massachusetts in 1986, along with one of their
wives, a psychiatric case worker. One of these friends, a lawyer and former
professor at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, had so many clients seek17 Deborah R. Hensler, ADR Research at the Crossroads, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 71; Eliza-

beth Plapinger & Donna Stienstra, Federal Court ADR: A Practitioner'sUpdate, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LinG. 7 (1996). On the many open questions regarding settlement

generally, see Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994).
18 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Introduction: What Will We Do When Adjudication
Ends? A Brief Intellectual History of ADR, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1613, 1614 (1997) (on the
interdisciplinary work done regarding negotiation).
19 See http://www.ncsc.dni.us/KMO/Topics/ADR/FAQs/ADRFAQ2.htm (last visited Dec.
22, 2002).
20 Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Repealing the Law of Unintended Consequences? Comment on
Walker (2), 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 595, 610 (1994) (writing about data on settlement amounts).
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ing mediation that he relinquished his tenured position in order to mediate full
time. A former student of mine, practicing in upstate New York, reports that
many of his firm's federal cases are mediated by a magistrate. A well-known
construction lawyer, who was a partner in my former firm (full of very hardnosed litigators), mediates virtually all of his construction cases. Another
mediator friend of mine, whose firm is also known for its trial work, estimates
that mediation represents twenty-five to thirty-three percent of his practice.
There is increasing evidence that supports these anecdotes.2 1 We know
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure invite judges and parties to explore
settlement and, depending on statutes and local rules, various methods of
ADR.22 The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 requires all federal district
courts to consider a variety of ADR mechanisms. 23 The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990 requires federal agencies to consider using ADR at
all phases of their work, including adjudication. 24 A 1992 Executive Order
calls for increased use of ADR in the executive branch.2 ' The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 states that ADR "has the potential to provide...
greater satisfaction [for] the parties, innovative methods of resolving disputes,
and greater efficiency in achieving settlements. 26 The Act also requires each
federal district court to provide litigants with at least one ADR process. Moreover, each district court must, by local rule, require litigants in all civil cases to
consider using ADR at an appropriate stage in the case.
In 1996, a joint project of the Federal Judicial Center and the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution reported that "[m]ediation has emerged as the primary ADR process in the federal district courts ....
In marked contrast to five
years ago when only a few courts had court-based programs for mediation, over
half of the ninety-four districts now offer - and, in several instances, require I have not attempted in this article to ascertain the statistics on the aggregate amount of
arbitration taking place in this country. Given the imprimatur of Congress on arbitration
results, and the United States Supreme Court's embrace of compelled binding arbitration,
arbitration has probably also shown enormous growth. In binding arbitration, however, a
third party renders the decision, in a manner similar in many respects to judicial dispute
resolution. If I had the time and inclination, I would compare arbitration and mediation in
much the same way that I am comparing traditional litigation and mediation in this article.
One bit of data I would like to know is the extent to which arbitrations are now being settled
and to what extent such settlements are accomplished through mediations. My suspicion is
that mediation is entering the arbitration arena and that this, too, will continue to increase.
Perhaps, however, the arbitrators are more apt to act like mediators in the first instance, prior
to taking testimony.
22 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5), 16(c)(9).
23 28 U.S.C. §§ 473(a)(3)(A), 473(a)(6)(B) (1994). The expense and delay reduction plans
required by each district court were to authorize courts "to refer appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolution programs." 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6).
24 5 U.S.C. § 571 cmt. (1994) (Promotion of Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution, sec.
(a)) (original version at 5 U.S.C. § 581 (1990)).
25 Exec. Order No. 12778, 56 Fed. Reg. 55195 (Oct. 23, 1991).
26 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 at § 2(1) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 652(a)).
For a district-by-district description of ADR and settlement programs in the federal district
courts, see ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FED21

ERAL DISTRICT COURTS:

1996).

A
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mediation. ' 27 In 2000, Professor Deborah R. Hensler noted that "state and federal courts have turned away from non-binding arbitration and towards
mediation. 28
Mediation seems to have become the ADR method of choice at the state
level, just as it has at the federal. Forty-four states have mediation programs in
one or more of their state courts. 29 Here is one author's exuberant conclusion:
A review of the mediation data received from the survey indicates that the trend
today is definitely mediation. Approximately half of the states have partial or total
court-ordered mediation programs in effect . .

.

. Most states utilize mediation in

various forms, whether it is on a voluntary basis through the court, a mutual agreement made by the attorneys to facilitate settlement, or as a tool to resolve conflicts in
non-court-related areas .... The use of mediation to resolve disputes is so prevalent

that the Author is reminded of Roger Fisher's comment at the Harvard Negotiation
Workshop "that litigation is an alternative way 30to resolve a dispute."... It is clear
that the trend toward mediation is here to stay.
Mediation has had a meteoric rise and is apparently still on the upswing,
although this is less clear.3 t If we are, in fact, now in a new era of American
civil procedure and civil litigation, mediation helps define this era. How and
why did this happen?

III.

THE LAWYER'S PERSPECTIVE AND INFLUENCE

There is even less data on why mediation has become the ADR mechanism of choice. Although there is some discussion of the attraction,3 2 I do not
27 PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 26, at 4.

28 Hensler, supra note 17, at 77.
29 Mary Wisniewski Holden, As Courts Overflow, Mediation Flourishes, Cn. LAWYER,
Mar. 1997, at 1 (citing a Summer 1996 ABA poll).
30 Peter S. Chantilis, Mediation U.S.A., 26 U. MEM. L. REv. 1031, 1033-34 (1996). I have
placed in an Appendix at the end of this article additional evidence that I have accumulated
about the increased use of mediation at both the state and federal levels, as well as a summary of the dozens of different areas of law in which mediation has been used. Notwithstanding the lack of national statistics on the use of mediation in the aggregate throughout
the United States, all methods of proof I have been able to think of - anecdotal, federal
statistics, reports from individual states, articles on areas of law in which mediation is being
used, bibliographies - point in the same direction.

31 "The Price-Waterhouse Cornell 1997 survey ... indicates that 89% of U.S. Corporations
have used mediation in the last three years and that 79% have used arbitration." Gina Viola
Brown, ADR Statistics Report, A.B.A. Sec. Disp. Resol. (Jan. 7, 2002), citing
C:\TEMP\c.lotus.notes.data\STATSADR.doc. My friend, David Matz, is skeptical about
whether mediation is continuing to grow. He notes that enrollment in law school mediation
courses, mediator demand in courts, and the number of people seeking mediation training is
up some places and down in others; he states that "which way the wind is blowing seems to
me to be less certain than it was three years ago." E-mail from David Matz, Mediator and
Scholar on ADR, to Stephen N. Subrin (Feb. 24, 2002) (on file with author).
32 See, e.g., McEwen et al, supra note 16; Focus on the Future: ADR in the New Century,
51 Disp. RESOL. J. 10 (1996); Barbara A. Phillips, Mediation: Did We Get It Wrong?, 33
WILLAME=rE L. REV. 649 (1997); Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Why Attorneys Support
Mandatory Mediation, 82 JUDICATURE 224 (1999); CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW, Introduction
to MEDIATION: THEORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE xiii (The International Library of Essays in
Law & Legal Theory, 2d Series, 2001). A very large number of lawyers have been exposed
to mediation and decided they want to use it for their civil litigation. Although I wish I had
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think the analysis is as comprehensive as is justified. Nevertheless, I think I
can paint an accurate picture of its attractiveness to lawyers. I start with lawyers because: (1) so much mediation relates to cases that are either in litigation
or may soon be; (2) this article explores relationships between litigation and
mediation; and (3) I think I know a lot about trial lawyers, litigators, and civil

litigation.
Mediation is a subset of a negotiated settlement. It usually involves a
neutral person aiding parties to a dispute to reach a settlement.3 3 In order to
understand why lawyers use mediators, I think it is useful to consider why most
cases settle in the first place, whether there is a mediator or not. Only about
two to four percent of cases reach trial - an ever dwindling figure - and the
vast majority of all civil litigations, probably in the neighborhood of seventy
percent, are resolved through settlement.34
A.

Why Lawyers Settle Cases
1.

Uncertainty

Can you guess who wrote the following?
The uncertainty of legal proceedings is a notion so generally adopted, and has so long
been the standing theme of wit and good humor, that he who would attempt to refute
it would be looked upon as a man who
was either incapable of discernment himself,
35
or else meant to impose on others.
still more data, I think I could achieve judgment as a matter of law at this point on the
proposition that mediation is now an essential element of American civil litigation.
33 Mediation does not always involve an attempt to resolve a dispute. "In its simplest and
purest form, mediation is a process of facilitated negotiation among two or more parties,
assisted by a third-party neutral, to resolve disputes, manage conflict, plan future transactions, or reconcile interpersonal relations and improve communications." MENKELMEADOW, supra note 32.
3 "For example, in the federal courts, the portion of cases that terminated in trials dropped
from 11 percent in 1961 to 4 percent in 1991. Earlier there was a similar decline in state
courts." (Footnotes omitted.) Galanter & Cahill, supra note 17, at 1342. According to one
study, about two-thirds of the cases settle without a definitive judicial ruling. Id. at 1340,
citing the Herbert Kritzer analysis of 1649 cases in five federal judicial districts and seven
state courts. Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 162-64 (1986). Default judgments were omitted from this computation. The
Department of Justice conducted a study, Federal Tort Trials and Verdicts, for fiscal years
1996-97. The tort cases terminated in those years represented about nineteen percent of all
civil cases terminated. Three percent of them were either jury or bench trials, while ninetyseven percent were non-trial cases. Federal Tort Trials and Verdicts, 1996-97, at
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fttv97.pdf. The overall completed state trial rate was estimated at 2.9% of all terminations for 1991-92; the federal rate was 3.7%. Theodore Eisenberg, John Goerdt, Brian Ostrom & David Rottman, Litigation Outcomes in State and
Federal Courts: A StatisticalPortrait, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 433, 440-42 tbl. 3 (1996). In
2000, only 2.2% of federal civil cases reached trial (5,780 trials of 259, 234 total civil cases
terminated). Annual Report of the Directorof the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts 159 tbl. C-4. From 1996 to 2000, there was a sixteen percent decrease in the total
number of federal trials completed. Civil trials overall decreased twenty-three percent, civil
nonjury trials decreased twenty-four percent, and civil jury trials decreased twenty-three percent. Id. at 24-25.
35 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND,

BOOK 1II,

CHAPTER

XXII 1098 (4th ed. James Dewitt Andrews, 1898). For a thoughtful description of what one
Critical Legal Studies scholar has to say about the indeterminacy of law, see Duncan Ken-
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This uncertainty has, I think, been exacerbated by modem procedure, which
raises wide-open questions at every turn: what is the scope of a claim, transaction, or occurrence; what is a common question of law or fact; what is a sufficient statement of a claim; when does justice require an amendment; what is the
subject matter of the claim for cross claim and impleader purposes; what is
relevant for discovery purposes; does one have enough potential evidence to
survive a summary judgment motion or enough actual evidence to survive

directed verdict (now judgment as a matter of law).3 6
As Professor Burbank has pointed out many times, the Federal Rules are
uniform in name only; they constantly hide ad hoc discretionary trial judge

decisions.37 Uncertainty also arises in connection with procedural issues not
covered by a rule. Consider, for example, the complexities of applying the
multivariable test brought to us in World-Wide Volkswagen, Burger King, and
then Asahi to close personal jurisdiction cases.3 8
There is also evidentiary uncertainty: the Federal Rules of Evidence are
replete with textual uncertainties. How does one decide, for example, whether
a prior event or happening is too remote in time to be relevant? The exceptions
to the rules are legion and often perplexing. And then there is the uncertainty
of substantive law.39
For many, the legal uncertainties pale next to the factual ones. Blackstone
put it this way:
But, notwithstanding so vast an accession of legal controversies, arising from so fertile a fund as the ignorance and willfulness of individuals, these will bear no comparison in point of number to those which are founded upon the dishonesty, and
disingenuity of the parties .... And experience will abundantly show, that above a
hundred of our law-suits arise from disputed facts, for one where the law is
doubted.4 °

The lawyer must deal with witnesses (including one's own) who forget,
lie, misperceive, or are otherwise mistaken. Much behavior is ambiguous, as
nedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 518 (1986).
36 See, e.g., Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From
Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 655 (1971) ("Of the eighty-six rules that comprise the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the term 'discretion' appears in ten or so. Nevertheless,
appellate courts have held that review-restraining discretion is implicitly present in thirty
other provisions of the rules.").
17 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1474
(1987), reviewing RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, TEACHERS MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LmGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE (1985).
38 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102
(1987).
39 For an example of the uncertainty in a substantive law matter, see Jonathan R. Harkavy,
Privatizing Workplace Justice: The Advent of Mediation in Resolving Sexual Harassment
Disputes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 135, 148-49 (1999), in which the author lists seven
important unanswered questions by the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to workplace sexual harassment disputes "[d]espite its recent attempts at clarification." And consider the
vagueness of definitions applying to mixed questions of law and fact: unreasonable care,
proximate cause, defect, discriminatory intent, unfair competition, the amount of pain and
suffering, yet alone the multiple variables in choice of law doctrine.
40 BLACKSTONE, supra note 35, at 1101.
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are many documents. One does not know in advance which evidence will be
admitted, yet alone which evidence will be believed, or which tiny shred of
evidence the fact finder might latch on to as the most important. With the
increasing use of experts, one has the added uncertainty of whether one's
experts will survive the Daubert test, 41 let alone whether the expert will be
believed.

In some courts, one does not know in advance who the trial judge will be,
and even known, she is uncertain as to the judge's mood. Judicial rulings are
often unpredictable, and the politicalization of the judicial appointments process exacerbates the problem.4 2 If there is a jury, one is uncertain of its composition and ultimate decisions.4 3 And even after verdict, one is unsure of
remittiturs and additurs, new trial motions, judgment n.o.v., and the ability to

collect a judgment, not to mention the growing number of appeals. 4"
Lawyers represent clients who want to know what the result will be if the

case reaches final judgment. Given the multiple points of uncertainty, it is very
difficult to advise the client with any degree of precision. At best, the attorney

can advise as to a range of possible results, some of them extremely unpleasant
to the client. Settlement is a rational means of avoiding the risk of the possible
results that would be worse than settlement.
2.

Efficiency, Time, and Money

Each step of litigation consumes time and money. 45 Clients in overwhelming numbers are doing more attorney-shopping than before, and seeking
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
42 For a discussion of the issues at the highest state court levels, see Paul D. Carrington,
'1

Judicial Independence and DemocraticAccountability in Highest State Courts, 61

LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (Summer 1998). For an entire issue on political attacks on the judiciary, see 80 JUDICATURE 152 (1997). I realize the fact that judges are accused of making
"political" decisions does not prove that they are motivated by political considerations.
After reading enough appellate decisions that are split along political lines, however, it is
difficult not to believe that politics plays a role in how judges perceive cases. Benjamin

Cardozo put it this way:
Of the power of favor or prejudice in any sordid or vulgar or evil sense, I have found no trace,
not even the faintest, among the judges whom I have known. But every day there is borne in on
me a new conviction of the inescapable relation between the truth without us and the truth
within. The spirit of the age, as it is revealed to each of us, is too often only the spirit of the
group in which the accidents of birth or education or occupation or fellowship have given us a
place. No effort or revolution of the mind will overthrow utterly and at all times the empire of
these subconscious loyalties.
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 174, 175 (Yale Univ. Press,
1998).
43 Empiricists tell us that juries of six, now the norm in some courts, are less predictable
than juries of twelve, and more apt to arrive at aberrant verdicts. See, e.g., Michael J. Saks,
The Smaller the Jury, the Greaterthe Unpredictability, 79 JUDICATURE 263 (1996).
4 "The number of appeals filed in the courts of appeals rose from 3,899 in 1960, to 11,662
in 1970, to 34,292 in 1986, and to 48,322 in 1994." (Footnote omitted.) RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER,

& DAVID

L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL

COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 54 (4th ed. 1996).
45 In the contingent fee case, it is the plaintiffs lawyer who knows that the longer it takes,
the more time - and the potential to be earning money elsewhere - is consumed. It is true
that most defense lawyers, and sometimes plaintiffs' lawyers, are paid by the hour, and
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economies in litigation and litigation-avoidance.4 6 Consequently, client pressure for efficiency and savings pushes in the same direction as uncertainty
toward settlement, and early settlement at that. It is true that the defendant
often has the use of his money during a delayed suit. That the defendant also
experiences the interest that will be attached to a verdict, increased legal fees,
the desire to do business rather than engage in a legal battle, and the risk of
great monetary loss point to settlement, however.
3.

More Level Playing Field and Lower Expectations

Uncertainty and expense might not lead to settlement at such a high rate if
in any given case either lawyer thought that she had advantages that would
make it worth risking trial. A recent article by Steve Yeazell, Re-Financing
Civil Litigation, explains how changes in the composition of the bar, and how
lawyers finance cases, have reduced advantages that defendants' lawyers had
historically held by virtue of the size of their firms, their expertise, and their
ability to sustain losses.47 Specialization in the plaintiffs' bar, the sharing of
information, and the ability of plaintiffs' lawyers to get loans and to advertise
have resulted in a much more level litigation playing field then before. 48 On
top of this, as already mentioned, corporate defendants, particularly insurance
companies, are now less willing to give the defense bar free reign on extensive
and expensive trial preparation.4 9
On the other hand, experience and data have now made clear to plaintiffs'
lawyers, particularly in personal injury cases, how infrequently and how little
they win as a result of trials.5 ° A former student of mine, a plaintiff's torts
lawyer in upstate New York, has explained to me why jury trials have become
considerably less attractive to the plaintiffs bar in personal injury cases. 5
Media reports of cases in the popular press, as well as insurance anti-plaintiff
advertising and plaintiffs' lawyer mass advertising, have made many jurors
therefore, hypothetically and often realistically, the more time spent, the more the fee. But
there is accumulating evidence that clients are increasingly monitoring the time spent by
lawyers, the tasks performed by lawyers, the number of lawyers assigned to tasks, the hourly
rates, and the ultimate bills. See, e.g., Darlene Ricker, Greed, Ignoranceand Overbilling, 80
A.B.A. J. 62 (1994).
46 See, e.g., Robert I. Weil, Insurance Companies and Their Lawyers - The Cost Squeeze,
32 DEF. L.J. 391, 396-97 (1983); Andrew Blum, Insurers' Cutbacks Hit Firms, NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 22, 1993, at 1; Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice
at War with the Profession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 931, 950-53 (1993) (describing the sources of increased competition in attracting large corporate clients, including
greater stakes of legal actions and a more sophisticated clientele).
47 Stephen C. Yeazell, Re-Financing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183 (2001). See
also Herbert M. Kritzer, From Litigators of Ordinary Cases to Litigators of Extraordinary
Cases: Stratification of the Plaintiff's Bar in the Twenty-First Century, 51 DEPAUL L. REV.
219 (2001).
48 Yeazell, supra note 47.
49 See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
50 Yeazell, supra note 47, at 207; Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A
Study of Settlement Negotiationsand the Selection of Casesfor Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319,
384 (1991).
5i Letter from Matthew F. Belanger, to Stephen N. Subrin (May 10, 2002) (on file with
author).
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skeptical of any plaintiff seeking personal injury damages. The reduced opportunity for extensive voir dire has also made it harder to get a sympathetic or
even unbiased jury. Hence, in many cases, neither side may see an advantage
in going to trial.
4.

Hassle

Consider the hassles that come with litigation. Court clerks are not always
the easiest people to deal with, nor are judges. One can get enmeshed in a
myriad of motions, some undecided for long periods. Trial dates change and
continuances, in some courts, are the norm. Witnesses fail to show. To cope
with the wide-open nature of modem procedure, courts - and the rules - have
added additional steps, such as mandatory disclosure, scheduling and discovery
conferences, pretrial conferences, lists of documents and witnesses, summaries
of expert opinions, summaries of testimony, and lists of potential evidentiary
objections. I have not even mentioned dealing with one's own client and
opposing lawyers. Add to this the constant availability created by fax,
voicemail, e-mail, and cell phones, and these hassles are never ending.
The hassles are by no means limited to lawyers. Multiple discovery,
uncertain trial dates, and the trial itself create enormous interference in the client's normal life. The entire litigation process is anxiety-provoking and privacy-invading.
5.

Fear and anxiety

Today, fewer lawyers have a great deal of actual trial experience. Some
litigators have never tried a case to completion; many have never participated
in a jury trial. As one practicing lawyer put it, "make no mistake; it is not
trials, but discovery, that is the work of today's litigator (yesterday's 'trial lawyer').""2 The clich6 that associates in large firms gain litigation experience
only through mock trials held within the firm is sadly true. Moreover, in many
jurisdictions, motions are decided on the basis of legal memoranda without oral
argument. If you add this lack of hands-on or practical experience to the uncertainties of trial, it is not surprising that many lawyers in litigation departments
are fearful, or at least highly anxious, about trying cases. This phenomenon is a
powerful incentive to settle.
6.

Lawyer Perception of Client's Needs and Reactions

Losses are bad for a lawyer's reputation and client relations. Such losses
are exacerbated when one does not try many cases as clients cannot see that
one's winning percentage is still high. There are other client needs, such as
preserving business relationships with opposing parties and confidentiality of
business practices, which are only peripherally related to the dispute at bar.
Each of these reasons adds to the impetus to settle.
Notice that there are exponential effects resulting from the settlement-suggestive variables I have outlined. When the variables are multiplied, there is a
statistically mounting degree of uncertainty. These variables lead to additional
settlements that in turn lead to fewer cases tried, leading to lawyers without
52 American Bar Association, Discovery, LIGATION (Winter 1997).
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trial experience. 5 3 Despite individual exceptions, fewer and fewer cases are
being tried.54
B.

Why Lawyers Engage Mediators

We have seen why lawyers settle. But that does not answer the question
why they want or need a third party neutral to help them achieve a settlement.

Some of the drive toward mediation, and perhaps even most of it in the first
instance, came from court rules or individual judges suggesting or mandating
mediation.5 5 Today, however, there is a growing body of evidence that lawyers
are content with their mediation experiences, as are their clients.5 6 And law-

yers, once exposed to mediation, say that they would choose to do it on their
own in the future.57
In trying to understand why and how this has happened, I think it is impor-

tant to consider changes in the legal profession. First, there is the enormous
growth in the number of lawyers: from 200,000 lawyers at the end of World
War II, to just over 850,000 in 1995, to an estimated 1,000,000 at this time.5 8
More and more, women are entering the profession: the percentage of women
in law schools increased almost nine fold during the period of 1963 to 1973,
53 This is not to say that there are not lawyers who are very willing to try cases and enjoy it.
See, e.g., W. Reece Bader, A Litigator'sPerspective:ADR is Fine, but Not Always Welcome
as an Alternative to Battle in Court, Disp. REsOL. MAG., Spring 2000, at 21 ("The trial
lawyer is trained as a warrior, not as a peacemaker.").
51 Yeazell, supra note 47, at 184, 185; supra text accompanying note 34. Once again, not
all lawyers are plagued by the uncertainty of result, or hassles, or other variables leading to
settlement. And, of course, there are individual cases in which one side or the other thinks
the result is quite certain, and in which the client and lawyer will try the case, rather than
take an unsatisfactory settlement. Nonetheless, it is true that there are fewer cases tried - for
instance, down from nineteen percent to two or three percent in federal court during the last
sixty-five years - and that many attorneys in litigation departments spend most of their
professional life in discovery and other pre-trial procedures, and very little in trial.
-- See, e.g., Roselle L. Wissler, The Effects of Mandatory Mediation: Empirical Research
on the Experience of Small Claims and Common Pleas Courts, 33 WILLIAMETrE L. Rav.
565 (1997); Elizabeth Ellen Gordon, Why Attorneys Support Mandatory Mediation, 82 JuniCATURE 224 (1999); The Cardozo Online Journal of Conflict Resolution; The National
Center for State Courts (NCSC) & The Policy Consensus Initiative (PCI), The State of the
States: Dispute Resolution in the Courts (Sept. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Cardozo Symposium].
According to one National Law Journal and American Arbitrator's Association survey, fiftyeight percent of the litigators surveyed used mediation because it was court mandated. In
1998, as we have seen, Congress passed legislation requiring mandatory ADR programs in
all ninety-four federal courts. The state courts of California, Florida and Texas also have
similar mandated mediation programs. Lisa Brennan, What Lawyers Like: Mediation, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 15, 1999, at Al.
56 Wissler, supra note 55; Gordon, supra note 55. See also Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A
"Party Satisfaction" Perspective on a Comprehensive Mediation Statute, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON
Disp. REsOL. 885, espec. n.7 (1998) (summarizing the research to date).
57 Cardozo Symposium, supra note 55.
58 Lawyers in Profile, A Statistical Portraitof the U.S. Legal Profession, 10 RESEARCHING,
LAW 1, 7 (1999). The big increase in law school admissions commenced in the 1970s, when

new admissions to the bar reached more than 20,000 annually, and an average of 30,000 in
the 1980s; these were the years that the ADR movement took off. Bar admission increases
far outpaced population growth. There was one lawyer per 695 in 1951, and one per 303 in
1995.
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from 3.8% to 15.6%, with females in law school classes reaching forty-seven
percent in 2001 .5 9 The proportion of firms with women lawyers increased
from seventeen percent in 1980 to forty-six percent in 1995; thirty-three percent of the firms had women partners in 1995, rising from twenty-six percent in
1991.60 The number of people of color has also increased, albeit less dramatically, representing twenty percent of law school enrollment in the fall of 1998,
"up from 16% in 1992-93, 11% in 1986-87 and 8% in 1975-76. ",61 The size of
law firms has grown, as has the number of solo practitioners, rising to fortyseven percent of lawyers in the private sector in 1995.62 Today, a lawyer may
have never met the opposing lawyer, may not have gone to the same schools,
belonged to the same clubs, or been in the same professional or social circles as
the opposing lawyer. 63 All of this makes it more difficult to build up the trust
or experience with the other side sufficient to engage in negotiation without
outside help. Lawyer incivility also makes it harder to commence a negotiation
or sustain one.64
There is evidence that lawyers have trouble focusing on the most essential
65
issues
in a case,
problem plus
exacerbated
joinder of
claims, earlier,
issues,
and parties.
Thesea reasons,
the lack by
of multiple
trial experience
discussed
59 Terry Carter, It's Not Just a "Guy Thing " Anymore: Law School Programswill be Different because of Who's Attending, Teaching, 85 A.B.A. J. 18 (Apr. 1999).
6 American Bar Foundation Update, 1999. As firm size increases, so does the proportion
of firms with at least one female partner. While less than one-third of firms with five or
fewer lawyers had a women partner, almost eighty-seven percent of firms with twenty-one to
fifty lawyers had women partners. Id.
61 Carter, supra note 59.
62 In 1998, Jones Day Reavis & Pogue had 1,074 lawyers; Skadden Arps Slate had 1,048.
Market Share Report of Largest Law Firms, 8th ed. 1, 1998; Source: FORTUNE, Oct. 13, 1997,
from U.S. BUSINESS LITIGATION. For solo practitioner figures, see American Bar Founda-

tion Update, 1995.
63 For a picture of the former homogeneous nature of the American bar, read JEROLD S.
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA, espec.
Chapters One and Two (1976).
6 See, e.g., Mark Hansen, Incivility a Problem, Survey Says, 77 A.B.A. J. 22 (1991)
(reporting on a survey of Seventh Circuit judges and lawyers); Marvin E. Aspen, The Search
for Renewed Civility in Litigation, 28 VAL. U. L. REv. 513 (1994); and the influential articles on discovery abuse by Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by
Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217

[hereinafter Brazil, Chicago Lawyers]; Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of
Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787;

Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposalsfor
Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978).
65 In Wayne Brazil's study of Chicago lawyers, several indicated that they started cases and

engaged in discovery before they did much analysis. Brazil, Chicago Lawyers, supra note
64, at 227-30. The Federal Judicial Center study on the Quality of Advocacy in the Federal
Courts suggests lawyer aimlessness. Judges and lawyers found "planning and management
of litigation" severely lacking among each type of civil litigator. The areas of "planning and
management" said to be most needing improvement were "skill and judgment in developing
a strategy for the conduct of a case" and "recognizing and reacting to critical issues as they
arise." Anthony Partridge & Gordon Bermant, The Quality of Advocacy in the Federal
Courts 6, 164-183 (Federal Judicial Center, 1978). On the failure of lawyers to focus their
cases until they have to, and on the mediation event speeding up that process, see McEwen
et al, supra note 16, at 1387.
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highlight the need for an experienced mediator who may, in effect, bridge the
gap created by a lack of trial and/or negotiating experience.
Another reason for using a mediator is related to the "prisoner's dilemma"
problem.6 6 To put it briefly, there are occasions where, if one party acts competitively while the other acts cooperatively, then the competitive one can win a
great deal. If both act in an aggressively competitive way, however, then
neither will do as well as she would have if each cooperated with the other.
But, both will be reluctant to be cooperative, lacking trust that the other will do
the same. Lawyers, less apt to trust one another, can easily get into a situation
where each acts in an aggressively adversarial or competitive way, to the ultimate disadvantage of both. An outsider can help in such a situation.
There are, of course, many other reasons why lawyers, and in turn their
clients, may find it beneficial to use a mediator. The parties may have information that they are afraid to share with the other; but, if each knew the other's
information, they might both gain from settlement (a problem called "information asymmetry" by game theorists).67 Emotions may make it difficult to commence or engage in non-assisted negotiation. When there are multiple parties,
the lawyers, unaided by a neutral expert, may have trouble figuring out how to
include everyone in the settlement, or deciding when it is best to accept a partial settlement.
There are a whole range of problems arising from the agency relationship
of lawyer and client that may make negotiation with the aid of a mediator more
successful than going it alone. Most lawyers understand or face the problem of
trying to keep the client's confidence, while at the same time delivering bad
news about the weaknesses in the case. This problem may deepen when clients
more frequently shift their business from firm to firm. Sometimes lawyers
oversell a case to a client in the first instance, perhaps seeking to secure the
client, and then need the help of an outsider to reduce the client's expectations.
When the client and the lawyer have slightly different agendas, an outsider's
viewpoint may be helpful.
Moreover, lawyers and clients may benefit from an airing in front of a
neutral who asks probing questions, enabling them to test their own sense of the
value of a case and the likelihood of potential results. The client may be more
comfortable with a settlement when she has heard the competing arguments
and participated in the dialogue and the decision-making. 68 There is accumulating data that negotiators tend to discount or reject settlement options when
presented by an opposing side, but that the same options become more palatable when suggested by a trusted neutral. 69 The attorney may want the media66 The best succinct summary I have read on problems of negotiation, including "the prisoner's dilemma," that mediators can help overcome, is Robert H. Mnookin, Why Negotiations Fail:An Exploration of Barriersto the Resolution of Conflict, 8 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP.
RESOL. 235 (1993).
67 Mnookin, supra note 66, at 240.
68 The work and research of Allan Lind and Tom Tyler come to mind, suggesting that
parties value a chance to have their voices heard and to participate meaningfully in dispute
resolution processes. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

(1988).

69 Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluationin Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO
CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995).
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tor's approval, or at least assistance in arriving at settlement, as a way of
insulating herself from the client's criticism or disapproval. 7 °
The data on timesaving and expense reduction through mediation is

mixed. 7 1 But, it seems to me, that in some instances it is likely that mediation
will decrease both delay and litigation costs. It is true that if the mediation

takes place late in the litigation cycle, one may be adding an expense that
would not be incurred if the parties settled on their own, particularly if the

mediation fails. But if the mediation takes place at an earlier stage, before total
discovery and motion practice are completed, and if the mediation is successful, then there has to be a significant savings in time and expense.7 2

Let's say that there are two lawyers, each charging $300 an hour. Assume
that each takes an eight-hour day to prepare for mediation, totaling $4,800. The
mediation takes half a day, or an additional $3,000 for the lawyers (five hours
times $300 an hour per lawyer). The mediator, we'll say, charges a flat $500 to
each side for the half day; that's another $1,000, for a total of $8,800. Thirty
hours of combined attorney time would cost clients $9,000 (thirty hours times
$300 an hour). Any amount of work that would have been in excess of that had
the mediation not settled the case would lead to a monetary savings.73 If one
adds to the calculation the time saved for the clients by avoiding prolonged

discovery (and the money they could have lost), then the savings are even more
dramatic. The savings are even more substantial in that subset of cases that
would not have settled at all absent mediation.
There is some evidence that lawyers are beginning to see that even their
discovery may become more focused and less expensive through the use of

earlier mediation. The mediation itself will often provide some new information to the parties. By discussing the case in front of a neutral and determining
what each side thinks it needs to know prior to settlement, the discovery itself
can be focused, and limited discovery or voluntary disclosure even agreed
In these respects, it helps in achieving the trust that a mediator needs to be effective that
the lawyers and their clients agree on the mediator and feel free to leave the mediation at any
time.
71 Cf., e.g., the Rand study results in 1996, in JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION
70

OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT

(1996), described in Hensler, supra note 17, and Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An
Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813 (2000);
with more positive results with respect to cost savings, based on lawyer estimates, from the
Northern District of West Virginia and Western District of Missouri, reported at Cardozo
Symposium, supra note 55, at 47, 48, and time savings in the Western District of Missouri.
Id. at 47, 48. Some studies do not show a lessening of delay or expense, while others do.
72 There is some evidence that mediations can successfully take place very early in a litigation. See, e.g., Cardozo Symposium, supra note 55, at 35, 45. For example, in the Western
District of Missouri, cases were referred to ADR thirty days after answer; only eleven percent of the attorneys thought that was too early. But in the Northern District of West Virginia, where cases are referred to ADR after discovery is complete and just before trial,
twenty-one percent of the attorneys said ADR occurred too early. Id. at 46. On varying
views of lawyers on when mediation should take place in relationship to discovery, see John
Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 839, 886 (1997).
13 I realize that there will be some paperwork involved with officially ending the case and
effectuating the settlement. One could either add a few hours and money to the calculation,
or assume that the client is saving money because they will have more time to work.

Winter 2002/2003]

A TRADITIONALIST LOOKS AT MEDIATION

211

upon.74 The number and type of experts needed by both sides, and use of those
opinions, can also be hammered out with the aid of a mediator.
Notice how many of the reasons that lead to settlement are also met by
mediation. The unpredictability of the result is obviated by the mediated settlement, just as it is by the unassisted settlement. Having a firm and reliable date
for the mediation, which takes place in a conference room rather than a courtroom, reduces the hassles of litigation.7 5 It is more difficult for lawyers or their

clients to be uncivil when they are sitting around a table, often drinking coffee
or tea, in front of a third party neutral with whom they are trying to figure out
ways to dispose of a controversy. 76 In short, the benefits of settlement overall
are largely subsumed within a mediated settlement.
Much of the literature heralding mediation speaks to the ability to craft
creative settlements, or settlements that add value to each side that would not
otherwise be available.7 7 I find it difficult to evaluate this claim. Skilled lawyers can also negotiate creative settlements that would not be forthcoming from
a judicial order or a jury verdict without the aid of a neutral. As lawyers, well
before mediation came into vogue, my partners and I frequently sought, and
often achieved, creative settlements. 78 As mediators gain more experience, and

as lawyers and clients gain more experience with mediators, perhaps a wider
range of options will be considered.
I will later address other positive attributes of mediation when I deal with
the critiques that have been levied at ADR, and at mediation in particular.
Before that, however, I want to look at some of the other currents feeding the

mediation phenomenon.
IV.

TiH

MEDIATION BOOM IN CONTEXT

I do not know enough, nor do I think we have enough distance, to attempt
to unravel all of the strands that have led to the meteoric rise in mediation; but I
cannot resist sketching out some of the things I think such an extensive inquiry
would likely reveal. In the past, I have written about two major procedural
reform movements: the movement that led to the Field Code, and the historical
background of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 79 In each instance, four
71 On how mediators sometimes act to mediate discovery, see Tom Arnold, A Practical

How-To Guide for Mediators and Attorneys, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 436 (Jan. 25,
1996).
75 It may not always be more comfortable for the clients, as in the example of a wife having
to sit in the room with her husband who has abused her. This is one potential downside of
mediation; I will discuss others in Part V of this paper.
76 McEwen et al, supra note 16, at 1368.
77 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5, 24-25 (1996).
78 Some believe, however, that our very education as lawyers, with its concentration on
legal issues, combined with our adversarialness, may constrain our ability to see creative
options for settlement. It seems likely that if the parties and their clients are talking with one
another in one room, or if a mediator is suggesting different ideas to each side in caucuses
and trying out different approaches with each side, then there will be occasions that a settlement will be reached that is more beneficial than could be achieved without the help of the
mediator. Id. at 25.
79 See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
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currents led to the reform: (1) obvious defects in the existing procedural systems; (2) agendas of the legal profession; (3) conservative ideology; and (4)
liberal ideology. I analyze the last two factors together. In each case, there was
also a supportive intellectual climate. Since the 1970s, all of these elements
have acted, and interacted, as incentives for the use of mediation.
A.

Defects of Pre-Reform Procedure

Defects in the common law procedural system helped lead to the Field
Code.8 ° Similarly, criticisms of that code helped propel the movement toward
the Federal Rules reform."1
Extreme criticisms of the Federal Rules, and practice under them, became
noticeable by the mid- 1970s. 82 The litany is well-known: discovery out of control, frivolous litigation, runaway juries, unjustified punitive damages, congested dockets, overaggressive lawyers, excessive costs, and delays. Much of
the criticism was quite overstated.8 3 Propaganda led by the business community and a conservative movement that disapproved of the results of litigation

brought by progressive advocacy groups (such as legal services offices, the
civil rights, consumer protection, and environmental movements) created criticism.84 Nonetheless, the critique had many elements of truth. Who can deny
80 For a detailed analysis, see Subrin, supra note 7, at 318, 328-34.

81 Again, for details, see Subrin, supra note 6, at 939-61.
82 See, e.g., THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (A. Leo
Levin & Russell Wheeler eds., 1979) (although the conference, the National Conference on
the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, was held in 1976).
Especially note the addresses by Burger, Kirkham, and Rifkind. See also Marvin E. Frankel,
The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975).
83 Respectable empiricism supports my view. See, e.g., STEPHEN J.ADLER, THE JURY:
TRIAL AND ERROR IN THE AMERICAN COURTROOM (1994); VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY

(1986); Brian J. Ostrom, David B. Rottman, & John A. Goerdt, A

Step Above Anecdote: A Profile of the Civil Jury in the 1990s, 79 JUDICATURE 233 (1996);
Michael J. Saks, Public Opinion About the Civil Jury: Can Reality Be Found in the Illusions?, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 221 (1998); Paula L. Hannaford, B. Michael Dann, & G.
Thomas Munsterman, How Judges View Civil Juries, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 247 (1998); Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors' Treatment of Corporate Defendants, 48
DEPAUL L. REV. 327 (1998); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the
Behavior of the Tort Litigation System - and Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992);
Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery
Abuse and the Consequences of Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994);
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the "Haves " A Little More: Consideringthe 1998 Discovery
Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229 (1999).
84 By the time of the fiftieth anniversary of the Federal Rules in 1988, it had become obvious to many that conservatives were attacking the then current civil litigation system and the
liberal Federal Rules regime. At a conference held at my law school, Northeastern University School of Law, such speakers as Judge Jack B. Weinstein, Judge Robert L. Carter, and
Judith Resnik commented on the political nature of the attack. Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty
Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriersto Justice Being Raised?,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901 (1989); Robert L. Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
a Vindicator of Civil Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2179 (1989); Judith Resnik, The Domain of
Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219 (1989). Two colleagues and I tried to demonstrate the
attack in the employment discrimination area. Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Judith Olans
Brown, & Stephen N. Subrin, Substance in the Shadow of Procedure: The Integration of
Substantive and Procedural Law in Title VII Cases, 33 B.C. L. REV. 211 (1992). For an
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that there were some frivolous suits, and some excessive and oppressive discovery? There was sufficient criticism 85 that some "reform" would take place,
and mediation, along with other ADR techniques, looked attractive.
B.

ProfessionalAgendas

In both the Field Code and Federal Rules reform, the profession itself
wanted change for reasons relating to lawyer well being. Before the Field
Code, for example, trial lawyers in New York were highly regulated in the fees
they could charge, which were largely dependent upon the length of documents
filed in court. A little known feature of the Field Code liberated lawyers to
charge whatever their clients were willing to pay, much to the benefit of the
elite bar as demonstrated by David Dudley Field.8 6 Moreover, accompanying
the drafted procedural rules were substantive codifications of law that benefited
the emerging commercial and industrialist class.87 A major purpose of these
efforts was to limit the discretion of judges. 88 Such discretion could be used to
alter the business-supportive substantive law.
In the case of Federal Rules reform, Charles Clark, the major draftsman,
made it quite clear that the new flexible rules would permit the practicing bar to
reap the benefits of participating in the emerging New Deal regulatory
regime. 89 Perhaps one of the most amazing eulogies of a legal figure was that
given by Whitney North Seymour, on behalf of the organized bar, thanking
Charles Clark for giving lawyers the gift of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 90
Judges, too, have professional agendas. An early argument of those favoring the Enabling Act, and subsequently the uniform federal rules, was that
judges had to be liberated from stringent code procedure that did not permit
them the discretion they needed to do justice.9 1 A major impetus to the ADR
movement generally, and to mediation in particular, was judicial concern over
growing caseloads, 92 particularly on criminal dockets. Also, critiques of the
litigation system relating to frivolous suits, delays, and costs added to this
movement.
Corporate and defense lawyers have come to embrace mediation 93 as a
method of cutting client costs and reducing friction among companies that
account of the conservative/business/defense bar sponsored recent revision of FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(B)(1), see Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking:
Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529 (2001).
85 I summarized this paper in December 2001, in a talk I gave at a Boston litigation firm.
One of the senior lawyers stressed the relationship of the growth of mediation in Massachusetts and the inability of lawyers to get trial dates in a timely fashion for their civil cases.
86 Subrin, supra note 7, at 320-22.
87 Id. at 322-23, 334-35.
88 Id. at 323.
89 Subrin, supra note 6, at 966-67.
90 Proceedings in Memoriam, 328 F.2d 5, 20 (Whitney North Seymour) (Seymour put his
eulogy in terms of the "simplification that was brought about by the Federal rules.").
91 Subrin, supra note 6, at 944-56.
92 See, e.g., POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 82, espec. at 23-35.
91 See, e.g., Holden, supra note 29, at 3 (drawing the connection between the growth of
mediation and litigation costs, overcrowded courts, and the number of criminal cases).

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:196

desire to keep doing business with each other. 94 Some plaintiffs' lawyers
undoubtedly see the advantages to themselves, as well as to their clients, from
having a neutral mediator point out the strengths and weaknesses of their case,
and from achieving settlement and the payment of money at an earlier point in
the process. I think it is fair to say that, by now, members of the practicing bar
have in large measure embraced mediation for their own benefit, as well as that
of their clients, both as mediators and consumers of mediation. Many lawyers
seem to enjoy mediating and engaging in mediation more than they enjoy
aggressive adversarial behavior. 95
C.

Coalescence of Agendas From Both Right and Left

The movements leading to both the Field Code and the Federal Rules had
both liberal and conservative strands. As noted earlier, the Field Code liberalized procedure to some extent and facilitated the emerging laissez-faire economy. Field was a classical Jeffersonian liberal, an abolitionist and advocate of
women's rights, who at the same time fought vigorously for business power
and anti-government regulation. 96 In a similar manner, the initially conservative Enabling Act movement, opposed vigorously by progressives such as Senator Thomas Walsh, was later joined by legal realists and New Dealers, such as
Charles Clark and Homer Cummings, FDR's first Attorney General. What had
been a William Howard Taft reform was passed as New Deal legislation.97
Chief Justice Burger, hardly a progressive, at the influential Pound Conference of 1976, sounded one of the first bugle calls for ADR. 98 But many
early proponents of mediation came from the progressive and feminist movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s, whose writings spoke of community,
cooperation, and listening to excluded voices. Mediation was to be a gentler,
more giving process than soul-destructive adversarialness, designed to
empower communities, particularly those inhabited by the poor, to participate
in solutions to their own disputes and needs. 99 Chief Justice Burger, the business community, and defense lawyers, indeed, make strange bedfellows with
these social reformers! t°°
9' In reviewing recent changes in the profession, a January 2002 article in the ABA Journal
reported how corporations and auditors hired by them started "poring over the bills that law
firms send out. And they began to pressure general counsel to cut spending, increasing the
power and prestige of in-house legal departments .... The same concerns pushed the greater
use of alternative dispute resolution. Businesses themselves were being scorched by
scorched-earth litigation and wanted a way to sometimes save both money and relationships." Terry Carter, Law at the Crossroads, 88 A.B.A. J. 28, 33-34 (2002).
95 McEwen et al, supra note 16.
96 Subrin, supra note 7, at 316-27.
97 Subrin, supra note 6, at 943-73, 1000.
98 POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 82, at 23-35.
99 See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 15-32 (1994) (giving four divergent stories of the mediation movement); Linda R. Singer, A Pioneer's Perspective: Future Looks Bright, but Challenges Include Retaining Our Core Values, DIsP.
RESOL. MAG., Spring 2000, at 26.
100 Linda Singer makes a similar point:
The [Pound] conference coalesced the interests of those who focused on access and participation
or voice with those who focused on costs and efficiency. Those interests have coexisted, some-
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I believe that a historian of the ADR movement is apt to find that it is also
being carried, or reinforced, by contemporary intellectual thought that goes

beyond easy labeling as liberal or conservative. The classical liberal thought of
the mid-nineteenth century helped support Field and his reform. Legal realism

was part and parcel of the Enabling Act/Federal Rules reform. As others and I
have written, an important aspect of the current civil litigation predicament is
the almost universal acceptance in intellectual circles that "reality" is subject to

multiple perspectives. 1o' Indeed, this is the hallmark of modem and post-modem scientific and intellectual thought. We have become distrustful of unified
stories, and increasingly look to context and complexity. This, of course, is
precisely how mediators tend to view disputes.
One should also consider the attraction of the free market theories that
have dominated the ideological landscape for the past twenty-five years, and
their emphasis on individual agency and choice. Part of the attraction of mediation to lawyers and their clients is that they help choose the mediator, as
opposed to being assigned randomly to a judge; they retain power over the final
disposition of the dispute; and can leave the mediation at will.
V.

MEDIATION IS A GOOD THING:

ENGAGING THE CRITIQUES

My analysis of the major critiques of mediation has been instrumental in
my evolution from opponent to proponent of ADR. I begin with the criticisms
that I, and others, have levied,'

much of which I wrote in a long letter to

Frank Sander in 1986.103 Although aspects of the criticisms overlap, the overall critique falls into four general categories: (1) a failure of rights vindication
and law application; (2) a process particularly detrimental to those most vulnerable in society, depriving them of legal protections; (3) a failure of the dignitywhat uneasily, in the field ever since and have helped to shape the dispute resolution profession
that has grown up as a result.
Singer, supra note 99, at 26-27. It is true that some of the opponents of ADR and mediation
were also making progressive arguments, but the opposition of those like Owen Fiss, and
feminists who saw mandatory mediation in domestic cases as disempowering to women, did
not stop the momentum towards mediation. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93
YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or
Anathema?, 99 HLv. L. REV. 668 (1986); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process
Dangersfor Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly:
Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BuFF. L. REV. 441 (1992).
101 See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, On Thinking About a Description of a Country's Civil
Procedure, 7 TUL. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 139, 144-45 (1999); Menkel-Meadow, supra note
77.
102 See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 100; Edwards, supra note 100; Grillo, supra note 100; Bryan,
supra note 100; as well as, Hope Viner Sambom, The Vanishing Trial, 88 A.B.A. J. 24 (Oct.
2002), G. Thomas Eisele, The Case Against Mandatory Court-Annexed ADR Programs, 75
JUDICATURE 34 (1991); Andree G. Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediationfor Battered Women, 15 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 272 (1992); Chris A. Carr & Michael R. Jencks, The
Privatization of Business and Commercial Dispute Resolution: A Misguided Policy Decision, 88 Ky. L.J. 183 (2000); Bryant G. Garth, Privatizationand the New Market for Disputes: A Frameworkfor Analysis and a PreliminaryAssessment, 12 STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y
367 (1992); Robert G. Bone, From Judgment to Settlement: The Changing Character of
American Courts, Address at Boston University (Oct. 16, 2000).
103 Letter from Stephen Subrin to Frank Sander, supra note 13.
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enhancing right to be heard in open court; and (4) losses to the community at
large as a result of the privatization of the judicial function.
A.

The Critiques
1. A Failureof Rights Vindication and Law Application

To me, ADR looked like an unfortunate attempt to escape law and the
enforcement of rights. The very term "dispute resolution" has bothered me
through the years because it implies that the central reason for adjudication is to
get rid of disputes, rather than concentrating on the application of law and vindication of rights.
In a democracy, elected representatives pass laws that grant entitlements,
rights, and legitimate expectations to its citizens; the common law developed to
do much the same. "The rule of law" adds a degree of predictability and nonarbitrariness to everyday life.1"4 Facts trigger legal consequences. I have not
been so naive as to think that we always know the events underlying a lawsuit,
or that the application of law is consistent and predictable. Yet it seems to me
that this aspiration of legal consistency was critical to our well-being. To the
extent that ADR and mediation disregard the events (facts) that engendered a
dispute and the relevant legal doctrine, then the goals of rights-vindication, law
application, and predictability are diminished.
2.

Harming the Most Vulnerable

The application of known rules is particularly important for the most vulnerable in our society, who cannot rely on more powerful people to treat them
fairly. Instead, they must rely on defined entitlements that are legally protected. It is important to have judges who will help ensure that citizens are
given that to which the law entitles them. Much of the ADR literature brags
about not being tied to the law, and this very flexibility may penalize litigants,
particularly the poor or vulnerable. For years I have pointed out to my ADR
friends that the conservative support of ADR occurred just at the time when
legal services offices, civil rights lawyers, and the Warren Court decisions had
begun to successfully confront social injustice.
3.

The Right to Be Heard

Moreover, it may be important for litigants to tell their stories in open
court, so that the world might hear of the unfair treatment to which they have
been subjected. Due process has always had a human dignity element. "Notice
and the right to be heard" means that we enhance the dignity and autonomy of
those who have been harmed by letting them tell their stories in public, and
having the law applied in a predictable way to their situation. As Justice Frankfurter noted, it is not just important to have the correct result (law applied to
found facts); it is critical that litigants feel that they have been treated fairly. 10 5
104 I have spelled out this "rule of law" of predictability, importance of enforcing rights
arguments, throughout my career as an academic. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 6, 985-1000;
Subrin, supra note 7, at 338-45.
10' Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149-74 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Felix Frankfurter suggested two reasons for notice and hear-
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Losses to the Community Resulting from Privatization

The "privatization" of civil lawsuits through mediation detracts from the
public good in a number of ways that go beyond fairness to the individual
litigants. Some have feared that arbitration and mediation deprive the public of
precedents, endangering the benefits of stare decisis. 0 6 As Owen Fiss has passionately written, a major purpose of courts is to articulate and effectuate public
values and rights, particularly constitutional ones.' 0 7 This is not a goal of ADR
or mediation.
Also, mediations rob us of jury trials. The framers believed in the jury, in
large measure, for political reasons, to control the potential arbitrariness of
judges and others with power, and to permit lay citizens to partake in the governance of their country. As de Tocqueville noted, jury participation was a
primary means of educating the population about law and about living in a
democracy.o8 Except for voting, most of us as citizens never have the opportunity to be a direct participant in democracy but for serving as a juror.
Confidential mediations rob the public at large of knowledge of wrongdoing. Much of what we know about the evils of asbestos, tobacco, and impure
drugs are the result of the dogged work of civil litigators who pressed their
cases in open court, slowly prying out the knowledge hidden by acquisitive
(and sometimes dishonest) defendants. 10 9 A trial in open court is a forum for
citizens to find out about illegal actions, to discover how to protect themselves,
and to disgrace wrongdoers. 11 o
The use of private mediators by those who can afford them also draws
influential and affluent lawyers and their clients away from the courts. This
may, over time, result in less pressure on legislatures, at both state and federal
levels, to fund or otherwise support the third branch. In turn, this may lessen
the prestige and importance of courts.
I hope I have captured the many strands of the critique. I now think,
though, that it is considerably less powerful than it first appeared to me.
ing: "No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give a person in
jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it. Nor has a
better way been found for generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that
justice has been done." Id. at 171-72 (emphasis added). He continued: "The heart of the
matter is that democracy implies respect for the elementary rights of men, however suspect
or unworthy; a democratic government must therefore practice fairness; and fairness can
rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights." Id. at 170.
For a review of the procedural justice literature, see Welsh, infra note 124.
106 Samborn, supra note 102, at 26.
107 Fiss, supra note 100.
108 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 303-07 (Henry Reeve trans., 1904).
For a discussion of the many reasons our founders embraced the jury, see Subrin, supra note
6, at 926-29.
109 See, e.g., THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW
(2001).
110 Carr & Jencks, supra note 102. Settlement has become so much the norm that some
claim that our adjudication system is not supplying legal opinions that are needed to permit
the common law to evolve to meet new needs; this is detrimental, particularly to the business
community that needs the guidance of written legal opinions.
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Responding to the Critiques
1. A Failure of Rights Vindication and Law Application

One of the many things I have learned from Deborah Hensler is the importance of looking at what is, rather than, or in addition to, what one wants.1" So
before one gets carried away with how mediation is depriving folks of rights
vindication and law application, one must first confront her sobering data on
how little lawyers consult with their clients, and how infrequently clients
receive full vindication of their rights, or even a realistic opportunity to be
heard.
How much careful delineation of law and fact actually enters into nonmediated settlements? The client ordinarily does not directly take part in the
bargaining, and although consulted, is in large measure influenced by what his
or her lawyer says the case is worth and what the range of possible trial results
are. Neither side may have actually enmeshed the law and facts in ways that
we, as law professors, would like to see our students perform in an exam.
There is little indication that pleadings ordinarily tell each side a good deal
about the most critical factual and legal points. Absent summary judgment
motions, there may be few occasions for any side to focus on what is most
important to their case and to share that information with opponents.
When I reviewed the literature for a speech about ten years ago, I discovered some evidence that lawyers, in fact, had difficulty focusing their cases on
the essential factual and legal points. 1 2 This did not surprise me, since law
schools have historically rewarded prospective lawyers who see the largest
number of potential issues and widest range of potential arguments. Moreover,
discovery, when the case warrants it, is geared to covering an expanded number
of possible paths. There is some empirical evidence, although gathered in the
1960s, that discovery added almost as many issues as it reduced, and that the
pretrial conference had a slight tendency to increase the number of issues rather
than narrow them.113
Ironically, mediation, which is accused of, or applauded for, being lawless, frequently does much more to bring law to bear on facts than traditional
litigation. I have not found any literature discussing in much detail the written
and oral overviews that many mediators suggest participants provide. From
what I have seen, however, these overviews permit the lawyers to present their
"1 See Roger H. Transgrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REV. 69; Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U.

ILL. L.

REV.

89. Although I am largely sympathetic to Roger Transgrud's fear of what is lost

for individual litigants as a result of massive joinder of parties, and how judges change their
behavior when confronted with that joinder, I admire Professor Hensler's insistence that
ordinary clients probably are not getting what we think or want them to get in ordinary,
bipolar litigation.
112

Stephen N. Subrin, The Empirical Challenge to ProcedureBased in Equity: How Can

Equity Procedure be Made More Equitable, in EQUITY
OPMENTS 761, 778-80 (Stephen Goldstein ed., 1992).

AND

CONTEMPORARY LEGAL DEVEL-

113 Id. at 778, drawing on WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY

SYSTEM 92, 97 (1968). This study was criticized in Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295,
1305-11 (1978); and MAURICE
TICE:

A

ROSENBERG,

THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE Jus45-58, 67-70 (1964).

CONTROLLED TEST IN PERSONAL INJURY LITIGATION
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positions; this means that all sides often relate the essentials of what they
believe happened to occasion the dispute, and why they think the law is in their
favor on the critical points. In fact, such an overview is often much more helpful to understanding the legal positions involved in a case than the pleadings or
even a summary judgment memo.1 14 The oral overview given by lawyers, the
parties, or both, at the beginning of many mediations also offers an interweaving of law and fact not normally found in civil litigation, absent the now rare
trial.
In addition, the mediator often seeks to further narrow and clarify the
mixed issues of law and fact in ways that may never happen during litigation.1 5 These occasions for focusing the controversy remind me that pre-Federal Rules procedure was designed to provide such focus and clarification.
Some historians believe that, prior to the written common law pleading system,
judges helped lawyers go back and forth orally before arriving at the single
16
issue through a traverse or demurrer.'
When pleadings became written, the combination of the writ system and
single issue pleading aided in the focus, perhaps excessive focus, of lawsuits.
The jury trial in the county at assize tended to be narrowly focused on the
single factual issue emanating from the traverse. When jury trials were more in
vogue for resolving civil disputes in this country, lawyers gained experience
through opening and closing arguments by focusing cases on the underlying
facts that were most important to a given legal consequence. In the mid-nineteenth century, David Dudley Field hoped that the requirement of verified
pleadings, with specific facts constituting the cause of action, would focus
cases on the most important matters in dispute.'1 7 Helping the lawyers sift
through the entirety of potential factual and legal issues trying to find the most
significant ones is one role of today's mediators.
I am quite sure an empirical study would show far more law application
takes place in a mediated settlement than a non-mediated one. Descriptions of
mediations show that mediators talk about what happened to precipitate the
dispute and the law that would apply. 1 8 Since the parties and their lawyers are
114 Such integration of law and fact does, sometimes, take place in demand letters sent from

plaintiffs to defendants. Matt Belanger tells me that some mediators require such demand
letters prior to the mediation. Belanger, supra note 51. Short of a pretrial memo, most
adjudication procedures do not supply a document that carefully integrates the most important of the facts and legal points.
115 For a description of how mediators go back and forth among the parties, see, e.g., Bruce
A. Coane & Ross W. Wooten, Successful Strategies in Mediating Employment Cases, 23
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 901, 916 (1997).
116 See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 399-405
(2001). 1 especially like this description of the relationship of the judge and the lawyers:
"[T]here was the substantial advantage that the court joined in the discussion, which thus
sometimes became a round-table conference of judges and counsel who joined in trying to
find a way of pleading a case which would bring out the real points." Id. at 405.
117 Subrin, supra note 7, at 328-31. It was hoped that discovery might do the same under
the Federal Rules, but I believe that most of us who have litigated under the Federal Rules,
or teach them, think that discovery has at least as much potential to diffuse and proliferate as
it does to focus.
118 See, e.g., the descriptions of mediators and how they act in DEBORAH M. KOLB ET AL.,
WHEN TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS (1994).
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trying to do at least as well as they would if the litigation commenced or continued, it is hard to think how they could avoid such discussion.' 1 9

Much mediation happens as a result of litigation and because judges mandate or encourage it; increasingly, however, mediation happens because lawyers suggest it.120 So long as lawyers are involved, they will do what they were
trained to do - discuss the facts that precipitated the dispute and the law that
should be applied to it. Deborah M. Kolb demonstrates, 21 and Jeff Stempel
points out 22 - and I agree - that mediators do a lot of talking about law and
potential legal results, and relevant fact and law application play an important
role in many, if not most, mediations.1 23 In summary, I think far more law
119 I have read some of the literature about facilitative and evaluative mediation, as well as
about transformative mediation. I am quite sure that if transformative mediators told clients
and lawyers engaged in litigation that the purpose of the mediation, for which the clients
were to pay, was to empower the clients and make them recognize the humanity of their
opposing side, they would lose a good deal of business. The idea that empowerment and
recognition is why most folks want to enter mediation does not ring true. If transformative
mediators do not tell their clients what their, the mediators', agenda is, I believe it is unfair to
those who come to them and pay them. Moreover, the likelihood that most human beings
will substantially change, be transformed, by some hours of mediation is most unlikely.
Talk to analysts or other mental health professionals. Think about how easy it is to alter
your own thoughts and behavior. It is a positive feature of mediation that clients may, in
fact, get more power than they do in non-mediated litigation. It is also positive that clients
and their attorneys may gain some experience through mediation in recognizing the needs
and humanity of opponents. It is surely a plus for mediation that it may help improve the
relationship of disputants for the future in ways that may not happen through trial or nonmediated settlement. But for most people engaged in litigation, or its distinct possibility, the
central purpose of mediation is, and will remain, to dispose of disputes. This will usually
make the facts and law important to them.
120 See supra text accompanying Cardozo Symposium notes 55-56.
121 KOLB, supra note 118.
122 Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Inevitability of the Eclectic: Liberating ADR from Ideology,
2000 J. DIsp. RESOL. 247, 263-71.
123

Although the underlying facts and the applicable law will play an important part in the

mediation of disputes that are in litigation, I think mediators should be extremely hesitant
about ever saying what they think the correct result of a mediation should be or what they
think a judge or jury would determine. The mediators will almost always lack information.
Even when one is dealing with her own client, a lawyer is not quite sure she has the whole
story of what the client knows, let alone what the other clients and witnesses know. It is
foolish to assume that parties and lawyers tell the mediator everything they know that is
relevant to a settlement. So far as I have been able to determine, the skillful lawyer at a
mediation, as well as the skillful client or party without a lawyer, is doing two things simultaneously: she is being an advocate trying to convince the mediator of her position and to
convince, or soften, the previous convictions of the opposing parties and lawyers, and she is
being cooperative and sharing (or at least giving that appearance) in an attempt to gain a
settlement, and perhaps even increase the combined value of what can be achieved through
settlement. The advocacy part of the performance will not permit all information to be
placed either on the table or communicated to the mediator confidentially. Even if the mediator knew everything, she would be plagued with the uncertainties about litigation that I
have previously discussed. Consequently, I think the mediator is probably most useful and
most honest in trying to help all sides to see the pros and cons of their positions, both
factually and legally; the range of possible litigation results; and the range of extra-litigation
options. This way, it is left to the clients and their lawyers to decide what is best for them
based upon their knowledge, expanded by what the mediator has suggested they might consider. I suppose I am concluding that "facilitating" includes, and should include, assisting
others to evaluate. Ironically, mediating lawyers may begin to look more like trial lawyers -
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application and integration of law and fact goes on in mediation than I had
previously assumed.
2.

Harming the Most Vulnerable

The critique that mediation can disempower the weaker party has bite to it.
There is inherent pressure to settle in mediation. But there is also pressure to
settle absent mediation. Frequently, the more powerful side can afford litigation and its preparation in ways that the weaker side cannot. To the extent that
the law does not aid the weak, it is unlikely that trial, non-mediated settlement,
or mediation will supply the lacking power; although there are occasions when
moral persuasion can be brought to bear at a mediation or trial. However, having lawyers present at the mediation, and encouraging mediators to explore the
law with the litigants, makes it more likely that the vulnerable will gain
whatever advantage the law allows. Much of the critique of mediation emanates from the experience of women in domestic cases in which the mediation
takes place without legal representation, and in some cases, without legal representation even after a potential settlement has been reached. Mediation in
which the specific mediator is imposed by others is also problematic; the
prejudices of any mediator will impact the enterprise. These criticisms are
well-taken, but having a choice of mediators and being permitted to bring one's
lawyer takes some of the bite from the critique.
If a litigant wants to stand on her rights, and seeks more total rights vindication than settlement permits, then the courts and judges should make that
possible and not discourage it. More on that at the end of this article, but in a
nutshell, having the threat of a rights-vindicating trial more easily available
should result in more protective settlements for the vulnerable, whether through
mediated or non-mediated settlements. The realistic threat of trial will cast a
firmer shadow of the law than when judges actively encourage settlement and
disparage those who wish to try their cases.
3.

The Right to be Heard

We are beginning to understand from the procedural justice literature more
about why it is so important to litigants to have a realistic opportunity to have
their stories and positions told to a third party.' 2 4 Litigants want to convince
the third party that their position is correct by having the opportunity to
describe their version of what happened, and why that should entitle them to a
favorable decision; it is also important to them, however, to feel that they have
been treated with dignity, and that the third party is listening to their story and
taking it into consideration in arriving at a decision. This is true even if the
third party ultimately does not agree with them. The literature suggests,
though, that litigants also feel fairly treated if they hear a representative whom
putting facts and law together in a cogent, convincing way and advocating with the use of a
coherent story - than discovery litigators.
124 For a review of the procedural justice literature, see Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in
Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787,
820-30 (2001).
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they trust, such as their lawyer, tell their story to a third party in their

presence. 125
Since mediators are third parties, and in court-sponsored mediation have
the imprimatur of the official court on the process, one should by no means
assume that mediation reduces the opportunity for litigants to be meaningfully
heard. Once again, it is important to be clear about the reality of the litigation
process. With or without mediation, most clients never have their voices heard
in a courtroom. As we have seen, most cases settle or are otherwise terminated
without trial. Although parties often tell their stories during discovery, oral
depositions take place before, or as a result of, mediations, and are controlled
by the attorneys. Even in the rare civil case where there is a trial, the question
and answer method, cross-examination, and evidence rules, hinder the client
from telling the story as she sees and feels it.
So far as I have been able to ascertain, clients play a much more active
role in mediations, and have enhanced odds that their story will be told in a
narrative manner by their lawyer or themselves. Although there may be an
unfortunate trend developing in the opposite direction,' 2 6 mediators have historically wanted the clients present at the mediation. At mediation, a client can
frequently tell her side of things without the interruption of the formal questionanswer, evidence objections mode of trial. 127 Clients hearing their own lawyer
tell their position in a joint session at mediation can be as meaningful as telling
their own stories.' 28 The joint sessions with lawyers and parties present at the
beginning of a mediation are perhaps far more significant to client satisfaction
than some mediators have realized.' 2 9
To the extent that dignity in litigation includes "being heard," it seems to
me that clients are hearing and being heard significantly more in mediation than
in most non-mediated settlements. And the comparison of being heard in a
mediation, as opposed to a trial, is not nearly so stark (or weighed negatively
against mediation) as one might at first imagine.
4.

Losses to the Community Resulting from Privatization

The allegation that ADR has prevented enough precedential case law from
being made is not borne out by the numbers. Although there are fewer trials,
the National Center for State Courts reports that the number of appeals rose
125 Id. at 841. In fact, some of the literature suggests that if the lawyers do a good job
telling the client's story, some litigants are even more content with the process than had they

told the story themselves.
126 Id. at 801-02. Welsh also notes that evaluative mediation has tended to move mediators
away from seeking creative settlements that are not solely monetary. Id. at 813.
127 Clients can tell their story to the mediator, even when the lawyer does not want the client
to talk in front of the other side. See, e.g., Coane & Wooten, supra note 115. Even when
the lawyer does all or most of the talking at the mediation, the client usually hears what is
going on, can make suggestions to the lawyer, and participates directly in the decision to
settle. Unlike the non-mediated settlement, each client hears the position of the opponent
and hears the comments and suggestions of a neutral.
128 Welsh, supra note 124, at 801-02.
129 Id. at 844, 846, 851-55. There are also opportunities at separate caucuses with the mediator for the client or her attorney to tell the client's story. Client participation may also aid
mediators in the search for creative settlements that are not solely monetary. Id. at 814-16.
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substantially in our country during the 1970s and 1980s, subsiding in the 1990s
with civil appeals growing only slightly in the last decade.1 3' The judicial
caseload in the U.S. Courts of Appeals rose 9.2% between 1995 and 2000, with
appeals of non-prisoner, non-criminal, and non-administrative
cases rising from
1 31
11,293 cases to 13,497 in the same period.
There is also no evidence that mediation has substantially reduced the
public airing of societal problems in court. Let us examine the data concerning
civil rights cases. 132 Civil rights complaints related to employment, housing,
welfare, voting, and other civil rights-related issues more than doubled from
18,793 filings in 1990 to 42,354 in 1998.133 The proportion of all civil cases
that had civil rights-related complaints increased from nine percent in 1990 to
seventeen percent in 1998. About sixty-five percent of the increase is attributed to the rise in complaints related to employment issues, which nearly tripled, from 8,413 to 23,735, in 1998. Of the civil rights-related complaints
terminated by trial verdict between 1990 and 1998, the percentage decided by a
jury increased from forty-eight percent to seventy-seven percent. Judgments
decreased from thirty-four to twenty-nine percent during this period, but there
are still many more trial judgments than result from the average civil litigation
(which is less than four percent).
Civil rights complaints filed in U.S. Courts of Appeals increased by about
eighty percent, from 4,729 cases in 1990 to 8,466 cases in 1998.134 Civil
rights-related appeals as a proportion of all civil cases filed in U.S. Courts of
Appeals increased from seventeen percent in 1990 to twenty percent in
1998.135 The data, then, at the trial and appellate levels, does not indicate that
mediation has prevented federal courts from hearing public law cases, nor has it
prevented them from articulating public law on appeal.
And yet, one must take seriously the accusations that mediated settlements
are a far cry from court orders that seek to make systemic change, and that
mediation does not create new rights that will help other litigants or disseminate knowledge about wrongdoing that will help others. In fact, confidentiality
makes it possible for private parties to keep their public-damaging activities
secret. Most painful to me, the total number of civil jury trials - and consequently, the number of citizens who are privileged to become
jurors - is dimin13 6
ishing. Perhaps mediation is the cause of some of this.
130 National Center for State Courts, at http://www.ncsc.dni.us/divisions/research/cspindex.html (last visited Dec. 22, 2002).
131 U.S. Court of Appeals, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Judicial Caseload Indicators,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov (last visited Jan. 22, 2003).

132 Civil rights cases are what Owen Fiss was most concerned about in his famous article
arguing against settlement. Fiss, supra note 100.
133 These and the following statistics on federal court civil rights cases are taken from
Bureau of Justice Statistics, Civil Rights Complaints in U.S. DistrictCourts, 1990-98 (2000),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/crcusdc.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2003).

134 Id. The data on civil rights appeals comes from the same source as the district court
data.
135 1 would like to know more about the data. For instance, how much of the civil rights
litigation is related to prisoners?
136 David Azar, Conflict Resolution Reduces Number of Federal Cases Decided by Juries
(Apr. 6, 2001), available at http://www.acresolution.org/research.nsf/articles/8010b831abb

0457685256a260075lab (last visited on Jan. 22, 2003).

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3:196

Once again, however, a closer look at what is going on takes some of the
sting out of the critique. One of the advantages of mediation is that it can help
the parties to a dispute work out methods for operating prospectively that are
more beneficial to both. For example, a mediated settlement of an employment
discrimination case that requires the employer to alter its future behavior may,
in fact, have more positive systemic impact than would be achieved through
litigation. 137
For a number of reasons, I am having difficulty figuring out the impact of
confidential settlements, arising from mediations, on the public good. First,
whether or not there is mediation, we know that most cases settle. Such settlements have been, and can be, as secret as those achieved through mediation. If
the manufacturer of a faulty product wants to settle with a single plaintiff, and
has the power to impose secrecy on the settlement, it can achieve this in or out
of mediation. If a plaintiff's goal is to broadcast the wrongdoing, she can insist
on this as part of a mediated or non-mediated settlement.
I suspect that confidentiality is a much more complicated issue in mediation than is sometimes assumed. 138 If I, as a lawyer, am told something about a
product in mediation that I must treat as confidential, in a subsequent case I can
do discovery with respect to the "confidential" topic. Even in the case in which
I got the confidential information, I can seek witnesses or documents that will
provide the same information.
Assume that a mediated case with respect to an allegedly defective product settles with a confidentiality agreement. If the case was already in litigation, then some document will be filed with the court that terminates the case.
A dismissal with prejudice or an agreement for judgment for one dollar, judgment satisfied, may be filed. Anyone can then learn that the plaintiff and
defendant settled the case from the public docket. The assumption would be
that the plaintiff got something that she wanted. If there are several such
"secret" settlements, the plaintiffs' bar will know that there is gold to be mined
in this field.
Finally, if there is a plaintiff and plaintiff's lawyer who cannot achieve
what the plaintiff wants through settlement, and/or wants the public to know
about the defendant's untoward activity, then they can refuse to settle or refuse
to settle with confidentiality. Again, this can happen with or without
mediation.
I have left for the end what, for me, are the most troubling aspects of the
mediation critique as it relates to privatization and the resultant harm to the
community at large: the reduced number of civil jury trials in open court and
the potential diminution of public support for courts as a result of the siphoning
off of cases in which litigants, who can afford it, hire private mediators. As I
have written earlier in this paper, I look at the American jury as an integral part
"' Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and Collective Action, 1999 U. ILL. L.

REV.

583. Some have suggested that by joining vulnerable parties at a mediation, through the use
of caucus representatives or otherwise, there can be increased power for those who are otherwise vulnerable.
138 For some of the complex questions regarding the confidentiality of mediations, see Eric
D. Green, A Heretical View of the Mediation Privilege, 2 OHIO ST. J.

(1986).
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of our democracy, and think it is a mistake to consider the jury trial as merely a
mode of dispute resolution. Since less than three percent of cases are tried, and
only half or so of those are jury trials, then the privatization of justice whether through ordinary settlement, arbitration, mediation or some other noncourtroom method - has deprived ordinary citizens of the opportunity to partake in governing, and in the society at large of the public airing of important
issues.
Once again, the questions are more complicated. One reason the civil jury
is so important is that it empowers citizens to participate in the important public
function of resolving disputes. As I have already pointed out, in mediation, the
parties themselves are participating in ways that ordinarily do not happen at
trial or in non-mediated settlement. Statistically, mediation may actually provide more private citizens experience hearing about the law and actively resolving disputes than the jury system.13 9
I am not arguing that a client who has more enhanced control, autonomy
and dignity through mediation is akin to serving as a juror, nor am I arguing
that mediation fulfills the same public function as a jury trial. I am only pointing out that some of the values of jury trials - educating lay people about law
and permitting them to partake in the important civil function of resolving disputes - may also be fulfilled at mediation.
I have not yet heard or found a convincing refutation to the criticism that
privatization through ADR will, over time, propel the more wealthy and powerful litigants and their lawyers away from public adjudication, and will in turn
reduce the prestige and the public support for the judiciary and the court system. As one lawyer told me, the contrasts between the relatively luxurious and
comfortable accommodations at a private mediation office and those found in
the all too familiar tattered and under-funded state courthouses are stark and
depressing. "at

I continue to be troubled by some aspects of the privatization of the public
function of judging, particularly the diminished support for the court system by
those with money and influence, which may well result in a second-class brand
of justice for the poor.' 1 '

139 Also, a huge number of hours of real trials are now televised, some of them viewed by
millions (such as the 0. J. Simpson cases), and have increased many fold the amount of
education about law acquired by the average citizen. Conversation with Brad Honoroff
(June 26, 2002).
4I See supra note 85, from the same lawyer. Perhaps one can soften the critique a little,
while regrettably not truly undermining it. Some mediations before private mediators do
take place in courthouses, thus continuing to expose the clients and lawyers in such cases to
the need for additional judicial funding. Moreover, judges and court personnel may learn
from private mediators the virtues of being more accommodating to the public. If trials
could be achieved quicker and take less time, this would make them more attractive. In
addition, courts could offer mediations to the parties at no charge, just as they offer trials.
' There is a large additional topic, not addressed in this paper, of what it means to put a
public imprimatur on the results of private mediations.
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JUDGES WHO JUDGE

Although there is danger to the judiciary from mediation due to the potential for reduced support, there is also self-inflicted danger stemming from judicial attitudes about the desirability of conducting trials. It is to this problem
that I briefly turn. The growth of mediation invites consideration of the appropriate relationship of adjudication to mediation. In general, at least one party to
a dispute will not come to the bargaining table absent the threat of a legal
sanction. Cases settle because parties fear that the result will be worse if there
is a formal judgment. To the extent that the potential judgment is too expensive to achieve in terms of time, money, and overall hassle, a party who could
otherwise count on a legitimate right has lost a good deal of bargaining power.
The civil adjudicatory process is critical in our country: it helps to ensure
the law is applied evenly; it permits people to have legitimate expectations; it
permits citizens to partake in governance; it checks arbitrary power; it permits
law to grow to meet new needs; it grants dignity and autonomy to citizens; it
educates jurors; it provides a safety valve for citizen anger; and it is a substitute
for armed conflict. The conference at which this paper was given was one
largely composed of civil procedure teachers. I did not think I had to lecture
them on the importance of the third branch.
But perhaps we do have to lecture the third branch. Twenty-five years
ago, at the time of the Pound Conference, it may have been important for the
judiciary to confront some of the abuses resulting, in part, from the wide-open,
liberal Federal Rules regime. For a variety of reasons, perhaps including lawyer incivility, frivolous litigation, and overly aggressive and expensive discovery practices, maybe more judicial control made sense. Perhaps it had become
important for judges to emphasize managing litigation and encouraging
settlement.
If I am correct in this paper, however, mediation is now firmly entrenched.
Moreover, we now have a good deal of data that the best management technique for judges is to set early trial dates, accompanied by discovery control in
those cases in which the stakes drive lawyers to extensive discovery.' 42 There
is data that judges who engage in active judicial management do not settle more
cases than those who spend most of their time trying cases.14 3 Also, to the
extent that judges engage in settlement discussions, receive information from
those who are so engaged, and are told about failed mediations, they cannot
help but hear inadmissible evidence. The management and settlement functions are somewhat different from, and can detract from, the judicial
function. "
142 Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in ProceduralRules and the Attributes of a Sound Procedural System: The Casefor Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79 (1997) (discussing and
summarizing some of the findings of JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM

ACT (1996)).
143 Stephen N. Subrin, The Empirical Challenge to ProcedureBased in Equity: How Can

Equity Procedure be Made More Equitable?, in

EQUITY AND CONTEMPORARY

DEVELOPMENTS 761, 787-88, nn.1 11, 117-19 (Stephen Goldstein ed., 1992).
144 Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982).
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The results of mediation are frequently - I actually believe usually dependent upon the range of potential results that would come from formal
adjudication. For this reason, in some cases, the parties and their lawyers want
to hear the trial judge's preliminary views of the case. And there are other
instances when a trial judge or magistrate who is not assigned to the particular
case may be in a good position to mediate. Lawyers have told me that clients
like the formality of discussing settlement before one in a black robe; it makes
them feel more like they are receiving official justice. Nonetheless, in my
view, the best way that judges can relate to mediation is to make themselves
available to try cases, and to decide pre-trial motions expeditiously and fairly.
There are increasing numbers of capable mediators available whom lawyers
increasingly know of. Judges do not ordinarily have to fill that role.145
To the extent judges complain that ADR has robbed them of hearing
important cases, they often have themselves to blame. Some judges apparently
think that if they can make clear to the lawyers and their clients all of the
burdens that formal adjudication entails, including its expense, time, delays,
unpredictability, and general obnoxiousness, then most cases will settle. They
are right.
One lesson that judges and court personnel can take from mediation is that
if the process is more accommodating to the needs of lawyers and clients, it
will be used. One lesson that I take from mediation is that the skilled mediator
needs judges to judge. To the extent that the judiciary can provide firmer
shadows, firmer predictions of legal results through adjudicated cases, mediated settlements will more accurately reflect what a fair result should be. It is
disturbing in a democracy that rights are lost because the formal system is
ineffective or because judges give the message, overtly or covertly, that they do
not want to preside over trials.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The increased use of mediation in our country has forced me, a skeptic of
the process through the years, to think more seriously about the extent of its
use, why this has come about, and whether the phenomenon bodes well or ill
for achieving a just and efficient civil litigation system. As the title of my
paper suggests, I am convinced that mediation will continue to prosper. The
reasons why lawyers and their clients are drawn to it are not likely to decrease,
and there are strong historical currents propelling its growth. Because of the
attention to fact and law in most mediations, and the opportunities for client
participation, it is a considerably better method of dispute resolution than I had
assumed.
Mediation, though, forces students of civil adjudication to begin thinking
more seriously about what would be the most beneficial relationship between
mediation and formal adjudication toward the end of achieving a sound civil
litigation system. I have become more comfortable with mediation, in large
measure, because its attention to underlying facts and law application is more
145 When judges do act as mediators, they should consider the procedural justice advantages
of client participation. See Welsh, supra note 124.
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pronounced than I had thought. Ironically, however, this very attention to law
application can, particularly in court-annexed mediation, lead to a dilution of
some of mediation's benefits. The push to have mediators evaluate the legal
merits of a case has often resulted in eliminating the opportunities for clients or
their lawyers, in the presence of all parties, to tell their stories to the third-party
neutral. At the same time that mediation begins to look more like adjudication
in its attention to law application, judges, who eschew the actual trial of cases,
have become more like mediators; but often they do not appreciate the benefits
of mediation that relate to clients meaningfully participating and being heard.
Fortunately, this is not a zero-sum game. Mediators can permit mediation
to be fact and law infused at the same time they take advantage of the opportunities to invite meaningful client participation. Judges can take advantage of
their unique role in two distinct ways: by willingly presiding over trials, and,
when they do act as mediators, embracing the dignity-enhancing values of client participation. I fear that the attractiveness of mediation may, over time,
draw the needed support of influential lawyers and clients away from the
courts. Judges can, perhaps, forestall this unfortunate development by making
the courthouse a more welcoming venue for trials and for mediation.
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APPENDIX - ADDITIONAL MATERIAL ON THE UTILIZATION OF MEDIATION

The Administrative Office of the United States Courts reports that of the
25,961 cases referred to an ADR process during July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001,
15,379, or sixty percent (in 39 different federal district courts), were sent to
mediation; the next closest ADR category was arbitration, at 4,594 cases.' 4 6 In
1999, Peter R. Steenland, Jr., senior counsel at the Office of Dispute Resolution
in the U.S. Department of Justice, reported that during the previous four years:
[T]he use of dispute resolution by the Department of Justice has increased four-fold.
A form of dispute resolution - usually mediation - is used in some 2,000 cases per
[A]
year to help find solutions to problems that are acceptable to all parties ....
growing number of parties in civil lawsuits are turning to dispute resolution, and
especially to mediation, to assist them in obtaining an early and acceptable solution
for civil litigation. Although there are many processes associated with dispute resomini-trials and summary jury trilution, such as arbitration, early neutral evaluation,
147
als, the clearly preferred process is mediation.

At a 1999 conference on "The State of the States: Dispute Resolution in
the Courts," sponsored by The National Center for State Courts and The Policy
Consensus Initiative, representatives of ADR offices from several states
reported on ADR activity. 148 Here are some examples. The Coordinator for
Dispute Resolution Programs at the Supreme Court of Ohio reported that a
survey of 2,300 Ohio attorneys showed that "mediation would be useful in a
broad range of cases including business disputes, personal injury litigation and
family disputes.... They favored mediation over arbitration."' 49 The Director
of the Office of Dispute Resolution for the Colorado Judicial Branch in Denver
reported that they were now mediating "over 2,000 civil and domestic cases a
year."' 150 The New York Community Dispute Resolution Centers program was
consistently handling "over 40,000 cases screened as appropriate for ADR each
year. Of these cases, over 22,000 mediations, conciliations, or arbitrations are
conducted."' 5 '
At the conference, a researcher on ADR in Minnesota reported that a new
rule became effective in 1994. It required lawyers, within sixty days of the
filing of an action, to consult with their clients about the appropriateness of
using ADR.' 5 2 Forty-eight percent of lawyers reported that they had used
mediation prior to Rule 114; after the advent of Rule 114, the figure rose to
eighty-four percent. Ninety-two percent of the lawyers responding to a survey
said "they would continue to use ADR, even if Rule 114, was repealed." She
116 ADR Staffing Credit, fax provided by David Williams, District Court Administration
Division, Administrative Office of the United States Courts to Michele Pearson, Northeastern U. School of Law librarian (Dec. 18, 2001) (on file with author).
147 Peter R. Steenland, Jr., The Role of Dispute Resolution in U.S. Federal Courts?,at http:/
/usinfo.state.gov/journals/itdhr/1299/ijde/steenlan.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2003).
148 Cardozo Symposium, supra note 55.
149 Id. at 7 (Eileen Pruett).
150 Id. at 13 (Cindy Savage).
'"I

Id. at 19 (Dan Weitz).

152 Codified as MINN. STAT. ANN. § 484.74 (West 2002).
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added: "Importantly, though, I have not said ADR
has been institutionalized.
53
It's mediation that has been institutionalized." 1
One can access reports on ADR activity within most states through websites. Here, for example, is information from Florida as of August, 2000:
In 1997 alone, approximately 125,000 cases were diverted from Florida's court system to mediation. Florida's court-sponsored mediation and arbitration services deal
with a full range of disputes from family law to small claims to large circuit matters.
As of July 1999, more than 12,000 individuals have completed Florida Supreme
Court-certified mediation training programs. The Supreme Court has certified 2,296
county mediators, 541,871 family mediators, 2,298 circuit mediators, and 80 depen1
dency mediators.

The following is from the annual report of the Hawaii State Judiciary:
"There are six community mediation centers on five islands ....The community mediation centers handle neighbor disputes, landlord/tenant, restitution
cases, condominium disputes, health conflicts, real estate disagreements, and
domestic cases." 155 A 1997 Texas ADR Legislative Report states:
The use of ADR processes in employment disputes increased 41% since 1996. Over
one-third of the responding agencies use ADR in attempting to resolve employment
disputes. Most significantly, 100% of reporting agencies that employ at least 1500
people utilize one or more ADR 156
processes in this area. The overwhelming ADR
process of choice was mediation.

We see the same theme emerging in an article summarizing the Indiana
quarterly reports submitted by every court throughout the state:
What can be gleaned about mediation in Indiana from these reports? First of all and
most strikingly is the dramatic fashion in which mediation referrals have increased
over the years. In 1992 only 647 cases were referred to mediation. By 1997, that
number had increased to 5,917, an increase of more than 814 percent .... By 1997,
...[the percentage of new court case filings referred to mediation] reached 4.8
percent. The rise of mediation is even more dramatic than is reflected in the quarterly reports when you consider that a large number of cases are being mediated
either pre-suit or157
simply by agreement of the parties (without court order) after litigation has begun.

Such cases are not reported in the quarterly reports as cases referred to
mediation.
A second fact which can be gleaned from the courts' quarterly reports and which
bears out what most practicing mediators in Indiana already intuitively know is that
the vast majority of cases referred to mediation by Indiana courts are not domestic in
nature.... Even a cursory examination of the facts laid out in this article reveals the
spectacular growth and impact that mediation has had on the resolution of disputes in
158
Indiana. That impact continues to grow.

The ADR Clearinghouse, including the National Center for State Courts
Holdings on Mediation, lists 138 titles; the books cover mediation in at least 17
"I Cardozo Symposium, supra note 55, at 41-42 (Nancy Welsh).

154 FLABAR ONLINE, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), August 2000.
155 Hawaii State Judiciary Annual Report for the Period July 1, 1997 - June 30, 1998, at 10.

156 Center for Public Policy Dispute Resolution, 1997 Texas ADR Legislative Report 3.
157 Steven A. Spence, MediationAround Indiana: Boom or Bust?, 42 Ras GESTAE 36 (July
1998).
158 Id. at 36, 38.
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states.' 5"9 The NCSC gives contacts for ADR, usually including telephone
numbers, fax, and e-mails, for all 50 states.1 60 Most of the contacts are within
court systems; many of the notes include links to lists of mediators. The
Knowledge Management Office has information on fees and costs associated
with court-connected mediation that includes thirty-four states, covering every
region of the country, Alaska and Hawaii.' 6 A 2001 bibliography of recent
ADR articles shows the use of mediation in a startling multiplicity of fields,
including trusts and estates, estate planning in advance, visitation rights, neonatal birth, libel, tax, mass tort claims, environmental, personal injury, and damages severed from liability.162 We know from other sources (articles, books,
discussions with lawyers, and mediators) that mediation has been used in all
kinds of tort cases and disputes involving patents, discrimination, bankruptcy,
attorneys' fees, divorce, custody, employment, appeals, construction, technology, health care, schools, commerce, contract, neighborhoods, and malpractice.
And, it is used when law firms and family businesses break up. It is also used
in accusations of workplace sexual harassment.' 6 3

159 http://www.ncsc.dni.us/is/clrhouse/bks-med.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2002).
160 Information Resource Center, Court Links, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR):
"Contact Information and Web-sites that provide Alternative Dispute Resolution materials
on-line listed alphabetically by state," available at http://www.ncsc.dni.us/KMO/Topics/
ADR/ States/ADRALGA.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2002). After the word "state," one may
also place ADRHIMD and ADRMANJ and ADRNMSC and ADRSDWY in order to cover
all of the states.
161 Information Resource Center, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), Fees and Costs
Associated with Court-Connected Mediation, (May, 1998), available at http:/l
www.ncsc.dni.us/KMO/Topics/ADR/FAQs/Fees and-costs.htm (last visited Dec. 22, 2002).
162 A Selected Biography, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 855 (2001).
163 Jonathan R. Harkavy, Privatizing Workplace Justice: The Advent of Mediation in

Resolving Sexual Harassment Disputes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135 (1999).

